War, Inflation, and Social Capital by Guriev, Sergei & Melnikov, Nikita
230
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2016, 106(5): 230–235
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161067
War, Inflation, and Social Capital†
By Sergei Guriev and Nikita Melnikov*
* Guriev: Department of Economics, Sciences Po, 
28 rue des Saints-Pères, Paris 75007, France and CEPR, 
London (e-mail: sergei.guriev@sciencespo.fr); Melnikov: 
Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics 
and New Economic School, Strastnoy boulevard 4/3, 72, 
Moscow 125009 Russia (e-mail: nmelnikov@nes.ru). We 
thank discussants Steven Fish, James Gibson, and Luigi 
Zingales as well as Yann Algan, Maxim Ananyev, Paul 
Dower, Sergei Izmalkov, Ekaterina Kuzminenkova, and 
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya for useful comments. We grate-
fully acknowledge the support of the Center for the Study 
of Diversity and Social Interactions at the New Economic 
School and the Ministry of Education and Science of the 
Russian Federation, Grant No. 14.U04.31.0002.
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161067 to visit 
the article page for additional materials and author disclo-
sure statement(s).
In recent decades, many studies in sociology, 
political science, and economics have argued 
that social capital matters for the effectiveness 
of political and legal institutions, for the pro-
duction of human capital and public goods, and 
for the efficiency of labor markets and corporate 
hierarchies (see literature surveys in Durlauf 
and Fafchamps 2005; and Ananyev and Guriev 
2015). Given its ubiquity, it is hard to create 
a single measure or even a definition of social 
capital. Different studies use memberships 
in associations, density of social networks, 
 survey-based and  experimental-games-based 
measures of trust, blood donations, and news-
paper subscriptions. Economists usually under-
stand social capital as the set of beliefs that 
promote cooperation and help to overcome 
the  free-rider problem (Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales 2010).
The multitude of interactions between social 
capital and many other social, economic, and 
political factors makes it even harder to iden-
tify social capital’s determinants and its causal 
effects. The few contributions that develop 
convincing identification strategies rely on 
persistent effects of exogenous variation that 
took place many decades or centuries ago (e.g., see Algan and Cahuc 2010 and Nunn 
and Wantchekon 2011). However, even though 
there is a large persistent component of social 
capital, it can also change rather quickly. Algan 
and Cahuc (2014) refer to these two views 
as “Putnam I” (as in Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti 1994, who argued that social capital 
is highly persistent) and “Putnam II” (after 
Putnam 2001, who showed that social capital 
can change). Ananyev and Guriev (2015) show 
that Putnam I and Putnam II are not mutually 
exclusive:  short-term changes in trust during 
the Great Recession may have persistent effects. 
In particular, trust in Russian regions that suf-
fered the most during the 2009 recession was 
still 10 percentage points lower in early 2014 
than before the crisis (even though the Russian 
economy had already recovered from the crisis 
by 2013).
By definition, studying the variable compo-
nent of social capital requires  high-frequency 
measurement. In this paper, we develop a 
methodology for tracking social capital “in 
real time.” Following the insights from recent 
studies using Google data in social science (Varian 2016, and  Stephens-Davidowitz 2014), 
we proxy social capital in a given locality in a 
given week by the relative popularity of Internet 
searches for keywords for  prosocial behavior 
such as “blood donations,” “adopt a child,” 
“charity.” The search data have three advan-
tages. First, searches are based on revealed 
preferences rather than  self-reported. Second, 
they are carried out in real life rather than in 
an artificial lab environment. Third, they can be 
collected at high frequency.
Using this methodology, we construct 
weekly data on  prosocial behavior for 79 
Russian regions in 2014. Given the political 
and economic turbulence in Russia during that 
year, this  high-frequency measure allows us to 
study the response of social capital to the con-
flict intensity in Ukraine, changes in prices, 
and exchange rate volatility. We find that 
controlling for region and week fixed effects, 
conflict intensity increases social capital, and 
inflation decreases social capital.
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I. Russia in 2014
Russia’s 2014 was a turbulent year in several 
dimensions. For the first time in its  post-Soviet 
history, Russia openly annexed another coun-
try’s territory which resulted in several rounds 
of sanctions by Western countries. Russia 
responded with banning food imports from the 
West. In addition, the global price of oil, Russia’s 
main export and the principal source of fiscal 
revenues, collapsed by almost a half. Finally, 
Russia initiated a “hybrid war” in Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions of Ukraine which resulted in 
about 8,000 killed and about two million dis-
placed (according to the United Nations).
These dramatic events brought about a 
severe economic shock. Inflation started to 
increase from the annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014 (normally, inflation in Russia 
slows down in the second quarter). The sea-
sonal deflation turned around when Russia 
introduced  counter-sanctions on August 6, 
2014 (see Figure 1). In  July–September, the 
third round of sanctions cut Russian banks and 
companies from global financial markets. In 
 September–December, the oil price decreased 
from $100/barrel to $55/barrel. The oil price 
decline combined with the sanctions resulted in 
further ruble depreciation (which also contrib-
uted to inflation) and a great increase in exchange 
rate volatility. The latter peaked in December 
2014 when the ruble lost nearly 15 percent of 
its value within two days. The intraday volatil-
ity was even higher: during the trading day of 
December 16, the ruble was trading 30 percent 
below the December 15 opening level. This fall 
was reversed by the Central Bank’s overnight 
increase in interest rates from 10.5 percent to 17 
percent per year.
The intensity of the conflict in Ukraine varied 
over time. As we track Russians’ perceptions of 
the war, we use the coverage of the conflict in 
the media rather than actual data on casualties (the latter are not reliable and not available at a 
weekly frequency). Figure 1 shows the number 
of mentions of the war in Ukraine in the media. 
These measures are highly volatile. Their peaks 
are generally consistent with the periods of 
intensified fighting as reported by international 
observers.
All these developments were largely unex-
pected as they were triggered by erratic moves 
and the sudden departure of Ukrainian President 
Victor Yanukovich in February 2014. For 
example, in October 2013, the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook predicted 2014 consumer 
price  inflation to be 5.3 percent. IMF maintained 
the same forecast in the April 2014 issue of 
the World Economic Outlook. The actual out-
come was 11.4 percent. Futures markets in the 
end of 2013 predicted the ruble exchange rate 
to depreciate by about 5 percent during 2014; 
currency options also did not price in any sig-
nificant change. The actual depreciation in 2014 
was 40 percent. The conflict in Ukraine and the 
confrontation with the West also do not seem 
to have been planned in advance. In the end of 
2013, Vladimir Putin pardoned several import-
ant political prisoners; this is consistent with 
the theory that he was interested in restoring 
good relations with the West. However, once 
Yanukovich left Kiev, Putin sent Russian sol-
diers to Crimea.
II. Methodology
The high frequency nature of our measure 
of social capital allows tracking the impact of 
weekly events such as conflict intensity, infla-
tion, and exchange rate volatility.
Given the heterogeneity of Russian regions 
and multiple common  time-specific shocks 
that they face, we need to control for region 
and week dummies. This is why we cannot 
estimate a specification with conflict inten-
sity and ruble volatility (both are perfectly 
Figure 1. Evolution of Intensity of Conflict and of 
Inflation over Time in January 2014–July 2015
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correlated with time dummies). However, as 
different regions are differentially affected by 
either of these macro shocks, we can apply the 
 difference-in-differences methodology. We use 
a panel of 79 Russian regions (indexed by  i ) for 
50 weeks in 2014 (indexed by  t ) to estimate the 
following specification:
   Y it = α Inflatio n it + β Wa r t Distanc e i 
 + γVolatilit y t Vulnerabilit y i 
 + λ  X it +  u i +  δ t +  ε it . 
Here  Y it is our main outcome, the first princi-
pal component of Internet searches related to 
social capital in region  i in week  t ,  Inflatio n it 
is the food inflation in region  i in week  t , 
 Wa r t is the measure of conflict intensity in 
Ukraine in week  t ,  Distanc e i is the distance 
to the conflict zone from region  i ,  Volatilit y t 
is the ruble/dollar exchange rate volatility, 
 Vulnerabilit y i is region  i ’s vulnerability to the 
volatility (share of  dollar-denominated loans, 
imports as percentage of gross regional product, 
etc., measured in the end of 2013). Furthermore, 
we include  time-varying control variables  X it (in 
the main specification, this is average regional 
monthly income).  u i and  δ t stand for region and 
week dummies. We use  two-way clustering of 
standard errors by regions and weeks.
This specification allows to estimate the dif-
ferential effect of the conflict on regions that are 
closer to and those that are farther away from 
the conflict zone. We assume that the effect is 
stronger for the regions closer to the conflict 
during the periods of more intensive fighting. 
Hence, the coefficient  β represents the effect 
of war on social capital (if  β > 0 , war has a 
negative impact on social capital). In turn, the 
coefficient  γ represents the effect of ruble vola-
tility as the latter is more likely to affect regions 
whose economies are more vulnerable to cur-
rency shocks. Finally, the coefficient  α captures 
the impact of inflation that varies both across 
regions and over time.
III. Data
A. Constructing a Measure of Social Capital
To construct a  high-frequency measure for the 
social capital in Russian regions, we begin with 
defining the categories of  prosocial  activities. 
We choose “charity and social help,” “blood 
donations,” and “child care and adoption.” 
Then we proceed to determine the most popular 
Internet searches that are related to each of these 
categories.
We use data from Russia’s leading Internet 
search engine, Yandex.1 The data on the compo-
sition of searches by week and region are avail-
able at wordstat.yandex.ru. We find that the most 
prominent searches connected to the categories 
above are “blood donations,” “adopt a child,” 
“orphanage,” “charitable foundation,” “help 
children,” and “social protection.” As Russian 
regions are vastly different in terms of  population 
and economic development, we use the rela-
tive popularity of these keywords (number of 
searches for a given keyword during a particular 
period divided by the overall number of searches 
during the same period within the region) rather 
than the absolute number of searches.
We then construct the first principal 
 component for these six searches using weekly 
data for each of 79 Russian regions.2 We col-
lect the data for weeks starting from January 20, 
2014 to July 6, 2015.
The first principal component explains 73 per-
cent of variation in the six variables and has the 
following weights: (i) Social protection: 0.864; (ii) Blood donations: 0.003; (iii) Adopt a child: 
0.029; (iv) Orphanage: 0.470; (v) Charitable 
foundation: 0.023; (vi) Help children: 0.178.3
B. Validating the Measure of Social Capital
In order to validate the measure of social 
capital based on Internet searches, we use a 
 survey-based measure of generalized social 
trust. In April 2014, Russian Public Opinion 
Foundation (Fond Obschestvennogo Mneniya, 
or FOM) included a standard question on 
1 In 2014, Yandex’s market share in Internet search in 
Russia was above 60 percent. Also, there were no publicly 
available data on Google searches at the regional level. 
2 We exclude Chechnya, Ingushetia, Chukotka, the 
Nenets autonomous region, and Crimea because of unavail-
ability or poor quality of data. 
3 The fact that the weights are so different is explained 
by large variation in the magnitudes of the six variables. 
When those are normalized by their means in April 2014, 
the weights are 0.60, 0.19, 0.31, 0.36, 0.15, 0.60, respec-
tively. In the regressions below, we have used the principal 
component with normalized search data as well; the results 
did not change. 
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 generalized social trust in its regionally repre-
sentative GeoRating survey.4
Therefore, we can check the  cross-sectional 
correlation of our  search-based measure of 
social capital with the  survey-based measure of 
generalized social trust at a given moment, April 
2014. We find that controlling for the logarithm 
of regional per capita income, the Gini coeffi-
cient of regional income inequality, the level of 
education, the number of homicides per capita, 
child mortality, the urbanization rate, and the 
percentage of households with Internet connec-
tion, the  cross-sectional correlation between the 
 survey-based measure of trust and the principal 
component of searches related to social capital 
in April 2014 is positive and significant at the 5 
percent level.
The effect is quantitatively important: a 
change in the principal component by one stan-
dard deviation results in the change in trust by 
3.3 percentage points (i.e., 30 percent of its stan-
dard deviation).
C. Data on War, Inflation, and  
Exchange Rate Volatility
We measure the intensity of the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine by the popularity of the theme 
“war in Ukraine” in the media. We use both the 
international database Factiva and the Russian 
database Medialogia. As our analysis is based 
on the  difference-in-differences approach, we 
interact the logarithm of the number of mentions 
of “war in Ukraine” with the logarithm of the 
distance to the conflict. The latter is the distance 
from the capital of the region to either Donetsk 
or Luhansk, whichever is closer.
We calculate the weekly volatility of the ruble 
exchange rate and interact it with the share of 
 dollar-denominated debt in total debt in the 
region as of January 2014. We also interact the 
exchange rate volatility with other currency expo-
sure variables such as the share of imports in gross 
regional product, the share of  dollar-denominated 
deposits in total deposits, etc.
As a proxy for inflation in a given week in a 
given region we use the weekly change in the 
price of the minimal food basket defined by the 
4 See Ananyev and Guriev (2015) for the description of 
the GeoRating sample structure and the formulation of the 
question on trust in the April 2014 survey. 
official Russian Statistics Agency (Rosstat). In 
December of 2014, the price of this basket was 
15 percent higher than the year before.
IV. Results
Table 1 presents our main results. In all 
specifications, the principal component of 
 social-capital-related searches is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the weekly infla-
tion rate. The magnitude, however, is small: 
an increase of inflation by one standard devia-
tion (45 percentage points in annualized terms) 
results in a decrease in the principal compo-
nent by 7 percent of its standard deviation. 
The coefficient of the conflict intensity inter-
acted with distance to conflict is negative and 
significant—and much larger in magnitude. 
Being closer to the conflict during more intense 
fighting by one standard deviation results in 
an increase in our measure of social capital by 
about half of the standard deviation. The fact 
that the coefficient is negative implies more 
 prosocial behavior in areas closer to the conflict. 
This is consistent with the willingness to engage 
in more civic behavior as the conflict is near—
due to empathy toward the victims.5
As a placebo, we also add to the regression 
the intensity of conflict interacted with the dis-
tance to Moscow (which is located at the very 
same longitude as Donetsk). The coefficient at 
this interaction term is small and not significant, 
while the coefficient at the interaction with the 
distance to the conflict still is. Thus, it is indeed 
the distance to the conflict rather than the dis-
tance to Moscow that matters.
The variables related to the exchange rate vol-
atility are not statistically significant, whether 
controlling or not controlling for inflation. We do 
not report the respective specifications and coef-
ficients at these variables. Income is also not sta-
tistically significant. This is not surprising given 
that income does not vary  substantially during 
the year (74 percent of variation in income is 
5 The alternative explanation is that a military success 
may contribute to nationalism, which in turn drives  prosocial 
behavior. In our setting, it is unlikely to be the case given that 
there has been no clear “success” in the Eastern Ukraine. 
Also, in the  cross-sectional regressions, our measure of 
social capital is positively correlated with homicides per 
capita. The latter is consistent with the “empathy” explana-
tion above rather than the “nationalism” one. 
MAY 2016234 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
explained by regional dummies). This implies 
that we should interpret the negative correlation 
of social capital with inflation as a positive cor-
relation with real income.
We have also run a number of robustness 
checks. We have run the regressions for the 
whole dataset covering January 2014—July 
2015 period. The results are robust. We have 
used Medialogia rather than Factiva media data; 
the results are exactly the same. We have con-
structed two other measures of conflict inten-
sity. First, we calculated the mentions of war in 
Ukraine in the top ten Russian media (including 
TV channels, radio, and newspapers) weighted 
by their audience in the end of 2013. Second, 
we used the total number of Internet searches for 
“war in Ukraine” in Russia in a given week. In 
both cases, the coefficient at the interaction term 
of conflict intensity and the distance to conflict 
remains negative and significant.
We have also checked if our results are driven 
by the direct effect of the war (e.g., immediate 
need to donate blood to the victims of the war). 
This is not the case: the results hold when we 
exclude “blood donations” searches and when 
we exclude regions closest to the conflict zone.
In order to measure the immediate 
impact of Western sanctions and Russian 
 counter-sanctions, we have also created dum-
mies for whether or not the specific rounds of 
sanctions are in place. Then we interacted these 
dummies with exports as a share of the gross 
regional product in 2013, share of agriculture in 
gross regional product, etc. We found no signif-
icant effects.
V. Concluding Remarks
Our analysis suggests that  Internet-based 
measures can help in creating meaningful 
“revealed-preference” measures of attitudes and 
beliefs. Since these are  high-frequency variables, 
we can analyze their correlations with quickly 
evolving characteristics of the political and eco-
nomic environment. This essentially allows to 
use event study methodology for studying polit-
ical economy questions.
We apply this idea to the case of Russia in 
2014. During that year Russia experienced 
a number of shocks that had an effect on the 
incentives for  prosocial behavior.
Our analysis shows that the effect of the con-
flict in East Ukraine was both statistically and 
economically significant. The higher the inten-
sity of the conflict, the more the Russians in 
regions close to the conflict zone would search 
for  prosocial keywords on the Internet. The 
impact of an unexpected outburst of inflation (which exceeded original forecasts by 6 percent-
age points) is negative and statistically signifi-
cant but its magnitude is not very large.
The timing of these events does not yet allow 
studying the persistence of their effects on 
social capital. We therefore can not yet analyze 
the relationship between Putnam I and Putnam 
II views in this case. Only after the conflict 
is over  will we be able to judge whether its 
impact on social capital has been temporary or 
permanent.
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